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Abstract
Cyber deception tools are increasingly sophisticated
but rely on a limited set of deception techniques. In
current deployments of cyber deception, the network
infrastructure between the defender and attacker
comprises the defence/attack surface. For cyber
deception tools and techniques to evolve further they
must address the wider attack surface; from the network
through to the physical and cognitive space. One way of
achieving this is by fusing deception techniques from the
physical and cognitive space with the technology
development process. In this paper we trial design
thinking as a way of delivering this fused approach. We
detail the results from a design thinking workshop
conducted using deception experts from different fields.
The workshop outputs include a critical analysis of
design provocations for cyber deception and a journey
map detailing considerations for operationalising cyber
deception scenarios that fuse deception techniques from
other contexts. We conclude with recommendations for
future research.

1. Introduction
Current best practice for discovery of a network
intrusion is 100 days, yet organisations that deploy cyber
deception can experience a 91% reduction in dwell time
in the network [1] by alerting system administrators to
unauthorised access. For any military organisation not
deploying cyber deception technology means an
adversary potentially has a foothold on Defence
networks and is able to extract information about
military tactics, techniques and procedures for 100 days.
This perimeter defence approach to cyber security is not
enough. Nowhere else in the warfighting environment
would it be acceptable for the enemy to operate inside
our boundary without active measures being deployed
once inside the perimeter. If we continue this
comparison with the physical environment we can see
that as the military move to a manoeuvrist approach
[2], away from relying on a defeat level of force, success
depends less on preparing solely for a zero- sum game
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through more efficient kinetic warfare and more towards
understanding how to achieve a desired effect on the
behaviour of the adversary. The same is true with cyber
security measures and the use of cyber deception
technology. While the current technology is increasingly
sophisticated and is advancing as a technological
capability, it is currently constrained primarily to issuing
alerts and logging. It has so far failed to encompass the
full range of deception tools and techniques that are used
in other contexts. In this paper we use design thinking to
explore ways to place cyber deception in the manoeuvre
toolkit of network defenders and to offer solutions that
have the potential to shape the will and behaviour of
adversaries in our networks. Deception activities that
aim to influence adversary behaviour have long been
part of military planning and are critical to the success of
physical military operations. With the network being
seen as a domain of warfare we need to find ways to give
cyber defenders the psychological tools to deny attackers
the freedom to operate in cyberspace.
Deception has been defined as, ‘deliberate measures
to induce erroneous sensemaking and subsequent
behaviour within a target audience, to achieve and
exploit an advantage’ [3]. The key elements here are
erroneous sensemaking, an intentional act to bring the
deceiver an advantage, a focus on the process of
induction used by the victim, causing a change in
behaviour, and targeting a specific audience. While
some cyber deception technology arguably meets this
definition, to a large extent the reach of such technology
is contained within the network and does not consider
the full scope of the attack/defence surface from the
defender’s cognitive processes to the attacker’s cognitive
processes.
Cyber deception has the potential, however, to
restore the balance of power from the attacker to the
defender, overcoming the asymmetric advantage that
attackers currently have [4], [5]. Traditionally, outside of
the network domain, deception is utilised to achieve a
range of different effects beyond offering a physical
honeypot to detect / distract an attacker. Such effects
incorporate simulation such as mimicking, inventing and
decoying, and dissimulation such as masking,
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repackaging and dazzling [6]. If one looks beyond the
technology-centric view and considers the experience of
the attacker being targeted, many of the principles seen
in other applications of deception could be used for
cyber deception (for example, see [7]).
Our aim in this paper is to explore how we can
synthesise deception techniques from deceptive concepts
employed outside of the cyber domain with cyber
deception technology and deploy them as part of a
network defence strategy. We highlight design thinking
as a methodology that can contribute to developing this
fused approach. Design thinking is a philosophy as well
as a practical process. It has creativity and innovation at
its heart and is about translating an idea into a reality
that creates value. It is inherently transdisciplinary
bringing together different academic disciplines with
practitioner experiences.
In this paper we detail the results from a design
thinking workshop carried out with deception experts
from academia, government, a cyber deception
technology company and independent defence and
security experts. Our participants have skillsets that
encompass social and behavioural science expertise as
well as computer science, software engineering and
cryptography. The outputs from the workshop include a
critical analysis of design provocations for cyber
deception and a journey map of potential issues to
consider when operationalising cyber deception
scenarios. We conclude with our reflections on the
workshop and recommendations for future research and
practice.

2. Background and related works
Cyber defenders are required to understand usual
network behaviour and activity, from which, deviations
may suggest potential threats [5]. Cyber defenders
operate in complex socio-technical systems and their
responses are influenced by their shared awareness,
organisational influences and level of expertise [8].
Nyre-Yu et al. [8] argue that too much emphasis has
been placed on improving algorithms and cyber security
analyst education while ignoring the integration and
interaction between the human and technology.
Cyber deception, however, has been an active topic
of consideration for some years. Cohen’s Deception
Toolkit (DTK) [9] dates back to 1998 and Spitzner’s
Honeynet Project has been in existence since 1999 [10].
In recent years there has been research on cyber
deception to protect cyber-physical systems [11], cyber
deception has been used in wargaming [12], and there
has been research on active deception for cloud
infrastructures [13]. While social engineering arguably
focuses on deception at the interface between behaviour

and technology it does not focus on the activity in a
network. Stech et al. [14] argue that cyber tactics are not
mapped onto the classic components of denial and
deception tactics; that there is no conventional
terminology to describe the phenomenon of deception in
cyberspace; that classic deception domain terminology is
rarely used; and that classic deception domain
researchers are rarely cited within the field. In short,
cyber deception researchers seem rarely to study, exploit
or build on the body of research that already exists about
deception in other domains.
As Shade et al. [15] have pointed out, most research
on cyber deception tools tends to focus on honeypots
[16], suggesting ways to improve them [17], deliver
them as a service [18], or to recognise their deficiencies
[18], [19]. Where cyber deception research extends
beyond honeypots it still tends to build from a computer
science or engineering perspective [18], [19], [20], [21]
with a smaller number of examples of research that
include the impact of humans on cyber deception
through, ‘cognitive models and experimental games’
[22] and ‘computational models of human cognition’
[20]. The assumption in such research is one of rational
decision-making with a focus on formal rules or models
in how decisions are made [23]. As cyber deception
research has highlighted, however, we also need to
understand the cognitive and behavioural processes of
both the attacker and defender to improve cyber
deception [22], [24], [25].
There is a limited but growing amount of research
that demonstrates the value of bringing behavioural
science and cyber deception together to deliver more
innovative cyber deception techniques. Oppositional
human factors for example, seek to flip ideas that are
used to improve cyber security, to instead disrupt
attacker cognition and behaviour and increase decisionmaking biases [25], [26], [27]. Attackers may not be
familiar with a system they are penetrating and they
should not expect a system to have good usability or
design that would benefit them [25]. This presents
opportunities to create deceptive systems, which disrupt
the attackers’ decision-making processes. With a vast
cyber-attack surface any gain from disrupting attackers’
decision-making is positive [25].
Creating decoy systems with large numbers of false
assets as opposed to real ones can reduce the ability of
an attacker to successfully target a real asset through
reducing their chances, distracting them from real assets,
and forcing them to switch attention and perform
additional tasks which, in turn, slows them down
[4][28]. Further benefits of decoy systems can be the
improved detection of attackers from their engagement
with false assets and increasing their level of confusion
about the network’s credibility [4]. Decoy networks have
been
extensively
tested
through
red-teaming
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experiments, including detailed exploration of red
teamers’ behaviour, personality and cognition, and
physiological responses to cyber deception [28].
Use of host-based deception and deceptive messages
has been shown in experiments to disrupt attacker
decision-making, increase the time to conduct the
deception and increase confusion within the attacker or
attacking team [15]. Other cyber security testing
includes Capture the Flag (CTF) exercises where
attackers are required to exfiltrate assets from a network
[29]. Such exercises, however, rarely measure actual
human behaviour, performance and cognition, in
response to active network defence using cyber
deception [29].
Exploring the behavioural facets of cyber deception
through experiment is valuable because as Shade et al.
[15] point out, experiments have the ‘necessary rigor’ to
deliver evidence-based results for the implementation of
cyber deception techniques. Gutzwiller et al. [25],
however, demonstrate the value of qualitative research in
cyber deception by using exploratory ‘think-aloud’
techniques with red teamers to understand how it might
be possible to exploit ‘traditional decision-making
biases’ with cyber deception tools. Shade et al. [15], also
highlight the value of collecting the qualitative
‘emotional experiences’ of those experiencing cyber
deception. Such methodological approaches facilitate the
gathering of rich data that, while it may not have the
generalisability of experimental results, arguably make
up for this by taking a naturalistic approach to cyber
deception and providing a range of complementary
insights.
The argument for a more naturalistic approach is
heightened with the knowledge that humans perform
poorly compared to algorithms in low validity
environments [23]. In naturalistic settings decisionmaking is often conducted in conditions of varying
uncertainty, time pressure, and cognitive load, which
affects the ability to assess options [23]. The key here is
to understand attacker and defender decision- making
across socio-technical contexts in the field, and using
input from cyber deception experts to inform how
deceptive systems are designed. In taking this approach
we build on the work of Reid and Black
[30] and their qualitative, inductive study. This research
includes a discussion about the connection between
technology, and the real-world context (referencing the
work on warrants and digital footprints by [31], [32])
and highlights the need for dynamic cyber deception
systems and methods [17], [22] and for deception tools
that are both ‘generic and expressive’ [28].

3. Design thinking
In the field of software development, design thinking

has been used in requirements elicitation [33], to
improve scrum and lean start up [34] and for innovation
in agile software development [35]. The value of design
thinking is also well recognised for designing military
systems [36] where Zweibelson [37] states that design
thinking facilitates ‘creating what is needed but does not
yet exist’. The aim of design thinking is to create new
ways of seeing, thinking and acting to develop not one
solution but ‘high-quality interventions to bring the
whole system forward into a more desired state’ [38]. As
Buchanan [39] suggests design thinking aims to ‘connect
and integrate knowledge from many different
specializations into productive’ results’.
Design thinking is both a philosophy and a practical
process. It has innovation at its heart and is participatory
and transdisciplinary in practice. The basic steps to the
design thinking process [40] are:
(i)

to empathise with the end user and their
understanding from their perspective;
(ii) to focus on exploring the problem in depth and
detail and from multiple perspectives rather than
rushing to fix on a solution;
(iii) to ideate by using divergent thinking to open up
creative possibilities;
(iv) to prototype those creative possibilities by
developing low fidelity models to start to refine
ideas through convergent thinking;
(v) to test the results.
The process for design thinking encourages
movement between divergent and convergent thinking.
Divergent thinking is about creating choices by opening
up possibilities and potential solutions, while convergent
thinking is about making choices by tempering these
ideas with real-world expertise and knowledge. It is an
approach that encourages constructive and generative
dialogue between inductive, deductive and abductive
reasoning. The innovation that potentially comes from
design thinking occurs because participants are
encouraged to step into different worlds and experience
different worldviews. This experience encourages
abductive reasoning by focusing on ‘what might be’ [41]
in the gaps between these various worlds and different
perspectives. The act of synthesising information from
different sources is an abductive sensemaking process
where we make a ‘motivated, continuous effort to
understand connections’ [42]. The resulting synthesis of
world views encourages innovation through a ‘leap of
inference or intuition’ [41].
Given that our aim is to fuse deception techniques
from different contexts and environments so that we can
innovate cyber deception tools, design thinking offers an
interesting approach. In terms of our research problem
our end user is the attacker as it is the attacker who is the
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individual experiencing the network environment and
the deception technology. As our interest was primarily
to generate new ideas for cyber deception and to start to
understand the implications of operationalising those
ideas, we focused on those parts of the design thinking
process that seek to understand the problem, and on
ideation and prototyping. We developed two tasks. The
first was to use provocations from different types of
deception activities as a jumping off point for
understanding the problem and ideation. The second task
was to use journey mapping as a way of prototyping the
ideas generated by thinking through how they would be
realised.

4. Data collection
We needed to take account of a number of potentially
destabilising aspects in our design- thinking workshop.
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic we had to run the
workshop online. While the facilitators have experience
of running design thinking workshops, online delivery
was new to them. We decided to use Zoom for video
communication and for creating two virtual break-out
rooms for group work. For the workshop activities we
used an outline whiteboard application called Miro. One
of the benefits of delivering the workshop online meant
we could include expert participants from across both the
UK and Australia. The drawback was that this meant we
were working across two time zones - for UK
participants the workshop ran from 0830 to 1100 and for
Australian participants the workshop ran from 1730 to
2000. We wanted diversity in our participants’
occupations and our aim was to synthesise knowledge
across disciplines, or at least bring it into generative
dialogue. This meant for this initial workshop we wanted
to invite participants who would be more likely to be
comfortable engaging in this type of activity. To
maintain privacy and encourage the sharing of creative
ideas we chose not to record the workshop but to collect
the outputs in the form of field notes and the information
created on the Miro whiteboard with virtual post-its
throughout the workshop activities.

4.1 Participants
While taking these factors into account we also
needed to identify participants with expertise in
deception, along with expertise in across social and
behavioural sciences, cyber security, software
engineering, computer sciences and cryptography, who
would also be open to a design thinking approach. As
design thinking is inherently transdisciplinary it is not a
natural skill for everyone. It is often a journey of trust,
risk and fear because as Bernstein [43] highlights there

is ‘pain inherent in abandoning one’s intellectual
comfort zone by working outside one’s home discipline’.
The lack of understanding of each other’s methods leads
to fragile trust relationships that can break down’ [44].
Accordingly, our pool of potential participants was small
and we invited six participants who comprised two
commercial technology designers, one Government
scientist from Defence, one independent behavioural
deception expert, one academic researching cyberspace
operations, and one cryptography engineer. Three of our
participants have experience of thinking from an
adversarial perspective in a cyber security environment.
Two academics facilitated the workshop – one in the UK
and one in Australia. Both have expertise in cyber
security in a national defence and security context. A
further academic with experience in the psychology of
deception acted as a note taker throughout the workshop.

4.2. Procedure
The two facilitators set up the Miro board with the
agenda, introductory remarks and the two workshop
tasks. Given that none of the participants had experience
using Miro we decided not to allow them user access to
the whiteboard because it would have been a distraction,
but to share our facilitator screens so that they could see
the tasks as well as the facilitators adding virtual post-its
of their contributions on the whiteboard as they worked
their way through the design thinking tasks.
The workshop was kept to 2.5 hours because our
experience of participating in online workshops is that
they are more tiring than physical workshops and also
because of the time zone difference. We started the
workshop with introductions, setting the teams for the
group work, discussing the agenda and setting workshop
rules to ensure we created a safe space where
participants felt comfortable to contribute freely. One of
the facilitators gave a brief overview of the design
thinking process.
Prior to the workshop each participant had received a
set of six design provocations on slides. The aim of the
provocations was to spark ideas and prompt different
ways of thinking about cyber deception. Each slide
comprised an image and brief explanatory text. The
slides included the following: (i) Japanese castle
defences; (ii) code smells in software engineering; (iii)
sliding doors (iv) gang graffiti and tagging; (v) the plot
of an Indiana Jones action adventure movie; and (vi)
deception for physical safety.
The first task in the workshop took one hour and was
a discussion of each provocation in turn, with discussion
points recorded as ideas on virtual post-its. For the
second task we also allocated one hour. We put
participants into two break-out groups to discuss what a
journey map for implementing the provocations would
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look like.

5. Analysis and discussion
5.1. Provocations
5.1.1. Japanese castle defences. This provocation used
the example of Japanese castle defences [45] where
paths would be designed to canalise attackers. The path
might be sloped with uneven steps so that attackers
would be forced to slow down or consciously navigate
the path. It might wind far longer than it needed to both
increase the distance attackers had to travel, but also to
make them more visible to defenders. The discussion
that arose from this focused on whether we could guide
an attacker through a network in a similar way, thereby
increasing the mental load on the attacker while also
slowing them down and making observation easier.
Interestingly the idea of lengthening paths has been
researched and, while still in early stages, changing
configurations in a network can increase uncertainty and
ambiguity [46], [47]. One participant made the point that
if the path is too complex attackers may well simply find
an easier way into the system and that might be via a
different exploitation route such as exploiting someone
with legitimate access. The other concern was that such
a defence might impede the normal running of the
network. The conclusion was that for cyber deception
this was ‘interesting but complex’ and the trade-off
between normal running and network defence needed to
be understood. There was discussion over whether this
was a deception technique even though it focused on,
‘influencing and shaping behaviour’. While not using
deception in the way we would normally expect, one
participant pointed out that it does work deceptively in
the form of a lure.
5.1.2. Code smells. This provocation was based on
‘code smells’ [48] and the idea that software code may
have a surface indication that ‘corresponds to a deeper
problem in the system’. For example, Martin Fowler
[49] suggests that ‘A long method is a good example of
this - just looking at the code and my nose twitches if I
see more than a dozen lines of java’. This provocation
raised the question of whether you could introduce a
code smell so that an attacker would conclude that, ‘This
doesn’t feel right for what I understand about the
machine’. One participant noted that code smells have
been looked at in forensic analysis, and they can cause
people to look more closely at areas of code. Depending
on the attacker there could be at least two outcomes from
a deceptive code smell; it could either scare the attacker
away or motivate them to explore further. Another
participant pointed out this was, in effect, ‘subconscious

anomaly detection’ and dependent on cues and pattern
recognition. To be useful the defender would need to
consider the level of fidelity required to ensure that
anomalies were recognised. This prompted discussion of
what would need to be considered when using cues in a
network because, in terms of behaviour and sensemaking, they need to not be ‘too thick, too big, too
many’. The conclusion from participants was that we
could take this concept and break it out into more detail
and that it could have lots of practical utility. The
question was raised though about how to make this
deception realistic for use against adversaries; for
example, how could it be automated, scaled and tested?
5.1.3. Sliding doors. This was a second provocation
based on Japanese castle defences and focused on the
idea of sliding doors that would allow access to different
parts of the building depending on which side they were
opened from, or may even just be one- way doors so that
attackers would be trapped. One participant noted that
this is classic deception. Another pointed out that there
are parallels in cryptography with one-way functions,
but few examples in the network space. A comparison
was made with ‘tar pits’ as cyber deception tools where
the attacker gets stuck and quitting the network is the
only means of escape. Participants discussed whether it
would it be possible to treat different types of network
traffic in different ways. For example, could this idea be
used to augment a tripwire approach to network
protection so that if a tripwire is activated the system then
changes how it looks to an attacker. Participants
believed that this had value for cyber deception but some
raised the issue of what would happen once the
deception was known about. One participant countered
this by linking the idea to cryptography where, ‘design
philosophies focus on the strength of the algorithm but
knowledge of the algorithm doesn’t mean that you have
the key’. Just because you know the mechanism is there
doesn’t mean it isn’t still valuable. This has been
addressed in recent research that demonstrates that
deception tactics can still be effective even when known
about [50].
5.1.4. Gang graffiti and tagging. This provocation used
the idea of gang graffiti and the way it is used to
symbolise a gang’s turf and to act as a ‘no trespassing’
sign to rival gangs. When it came to considering how
this could be used in cyber deception, participants felt it
could act as a potential deterrent to attackers. It was
observed though that what is more often seen on a
network is that rather than acting as a deterrent an
attacker would be more likely to either carry on with
their attack and force other attackers out, or to simply use
the network side-by-side with the other attackers. This
raises the question posed by one participant, ‘if you have
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multiple state actors and you see someone from your
organisation there, does that cause a deconfliction issue
back in the office, before you proceed further?’ Could
this be used to slow down an attacker’s progress if they
were a state actor? Another issue (similar to the one
made about code smells) is how this would impact on
the attacker’s decision-making process because for some
this would be a deterrent and for others a call to arms to
attack. Again, it was felt that this required knowledge of
the attacker and who or what they might be afraid of. This
raised the question of what fear might look like and how
it might be used in cyber space, causing one participant
to ask ‘Is it fundamentally different doing cyber
deception then?’ A suggestion was made that it might be
possible to increase fear in an attacker through the use of
‘cold, generic info to make them feel that they have been
doxxed’. A discussion ensued about how we bridge the
gap between cyber and physical to capture or disrupt an
adversary. Cyber creates threats and opportunities for
new forms of deception that do not occur (or that occur
quite differently) in the real world, through automation,
anonymity, impersonation, and digital footprints.
5.1.5. Indiana Jones narrative. This provocation took
the narrative from the classic film Indiana Jones and The
Last Crusade. In the film Indiana Jones has to deal with
a series of protective booby traps to find the Holy Grail,
which is hidden amongst hundreds of other potential
grails, all of which fatally poison the person who drinks
from it believing it to be the Grail. One participant
pointed out that the idea of multiple potential grails is
the equivalent of the cyber deception technique of haystacking (for example, hiding real database entries
amongst vast numbers of fake entries). Hay-stacking has
some weaknesses though if an attacker can see that the
defender is only touching the real object and the defender
has to ensure that they touch both the real and fake
objects. Another participant highlighted the fact that in
the film Indiana Jones has to escape from the system of
traps once he has got the Grail. In the network this
would be an attacker who wants to achieve their aim but
also wants to leave the network without being caught. In
the discussion it was pointed out that some of the
obstacles Indiana Jones faces are binary; if you trip one
of them you are out; if you are caught, you are out and
just as in the film there are, ‘lots of booby traps, just not
working the way you would expect it’ so the question
was raised about whether you ‘could conceive a parallel
to this in a cyber domain - booby traps tied with the
network self-destructing’ If a network self-destructs this
undermines availability inflicting damage on both
defender and attacker, potentially creating a denial of
service attack on oneself. If the attacker’s objective is to
deny the network this might make it easier for them
because it could tie up SOC staff from defending other

areas. The issue of exploits not working all the time was
discussed with the conclusion that attackers getting a
feel for their success rate could be a potential area for
cyber deception. If everything is failing, or not working
in expected ways, this increases confusion in the attacker.
5.1.6. Deception for physical safety. This was a photo
of a perfectly flat floor tiled to look as if it was
undulating to ensure that people walked rather than ran
on it. Again, one participant raised the issue of the
longevity of this technique and doubted it would
continue to work once it was known but another
participant compared this to Kerckhoff’s Principle [51]
noting that a cryptographic system should be secure even
if everything about the system, except the key is public
knowledge. This led to a discussion about what we gain,
if anything, from the element of surprise. Widely
publicising the use of cyber deception could mean that
we cause our attacker to question everything which, in
turn, could slow them down, as one participant
commented, ‘Even though I know it’s there - if I went
there, I would still feel uncomfortable’. While this form
of deception may have diminishing returns, with the
effect being greatest when first encountered, it could be
relatively cheap to implement. We see these types of
visual disruption in road flow control systems (e.g.
illusory 3D crosswalks, anamorphic images of children
playing in the street) to try to get drivers to slow down.
Initially, such systems are effective, however, drivers
soon become desensitized and are complacent in their
presence, thereby increasing risk [52]. We would have to
consider where we would get the most value from using
this in the network and whether we design a cyber
deception tool that was context aware. In response to this
one participant noted, ‘perceptual cues are very powerful
but very brittle – this might not work from other end of
corridor or at night, for example’ and there may be
similar issues deploying this type of cyber deception in a
network. The issue of timing of the use of deception was
raised. If you deploy deceptive assets too early you can
waste them, and if they are deployed too late then their
value may have ‘withered on the vine’. Participants
highlighted the need to consider both timing of surprise
in cyber deception and link it to the deceptive outcome
we want to achieve. Interestingly, this accords with
research recently carried out that demonstrated that the
late timing of deception in an intrusion reduces cyber
attacks [53].

5.2. Provocations and ideation.
As was hoped, the provocations raised more questions
than answers and participants demonstrated divergent
thinking when it came to creating new ideas for
implementing cyber deception. The discussion about
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what deception is, and whether cyber deception is
fundamentally different. Similarities and differences
between cyber deception and deception in the physical
world were raised especially around the idea of creating
fear in an attacker and whether it was possible to do that
on a network. There was discussion about the difference
between deception, and influencing and shaping
behaviours as well as the role played by more subtle
deception techniques such as lures, cues and patterns and
how these could be implemented on a network. The
potential of cyber deception techniques to work two
ways was also noted – either to deter an attacker or to
provoke interest so that they investigate further. Finally,
practical issues were highlighted such as how such
cyber deception techniques could be automated, scaled
and tested.

5.3. Journey mapping
A journey map is a way of designing a user experience for
a new product. In our case the user is an attacker in the
network and the product is cyber deception technology.
For this task we broke the journey map down into five
sections: (i) activities – this is where we focused most
effort considering what needed to happen to develop
innovative cyber deception technology; (ii) risks – what
we should be concerned about through the development
process; (iii) questions – what we need to know at each
stage; (iv) success – defining how we would know if we
had been successful; (v) opportunities and threats – what
else could help or hinder us in achieving our goals? To
select the provocations to journey map we asked
participants to think about where they would place each
the provocation on a PICK (Possible, Implement, Kill or
Challenge) chart – a two by two matrix that plots ideas
in terms of ease of implementation and potential
benefits. There were three provocations that looked the
most promising after the PICK activity, these were the
Indiana Jones narrative, the deception for physical
safety, and the gang graffiti and tagging. When we
reflected back on the journey maps there was significant
overlap between them and so we synthesised them into
one overarching journey map for developing new cyber
deception tools.
5.3.1. Activities. The journey that we mapped for
developing new cyber deception exploits comprised the
following activities. Firstly, we need an idea of whether
the attacker is human or software and, from this, we also
need to understand the motivation and what different
attack strategies might be invoked. For example, does the
attacker care if they are discovered or do they hope to
carry out their attack undetected? Second, we need a
clear idea of what we are protecting with cyber deception
and to surmise the likely path through the network that

the attacker might take. So far these two activities are
very similar to the process that would be followed for
any risk assessment on a network (understanding the
threat actor, the vulnerabilities and the assets to be
protected). The difference perhaps is the lens through
which risk is understood. For cyber deception capability
development, the focus should be on putting ourselves in
the position of the attacker and seeing the network
through their eyes, rather than ours as the defender, and
focusing on the technological tools we can improve.
The next set of activities are different, however, and
this is where, in the process of visualising the attacker’s
journey, our participants brought together their expertise
of deception techniques in different contexts. The first
step suggested by participants involved actively
exploring analogues from other domains of deceptive
practice. As a result of doing this a range of risks,
question, measures of success, opportunities and threats
arose so that the following additions to the journey map
were added for consideration when developing
innovative cyber deception techniques.
5.3.2. Questions. A range of questions central to the
design process was raised by participants. The most
important questions related to understanding how the
network might look from the attacker’s perspective. This
would require some kind of persona or threat model.
Participants raised questions about the level of detail
needed and highlighted the risk of relying on a model of
the attacker that turned out to be incorrect or flawed (for
example relying on previous attacker behavioural data
which is not always consistent with the present).
At the start of the process cyber defenders would also
need to define what they want the attacker to do as a
result of cyber deception. What is the desired behaviour
and how might the attacker’s sensemaking be shaped to
generate that behaviour? Subsidiary questions stemming
from this include:
• What perceptual cues do cyber defenders need to
provide to attacker to shape their sensemaking?
How can cyber defenders ensure that such cues will
be detected and attended to by an attacker? And
how can designers ensure that attackers will make
desired sense of these cues?
• How can cyber defenders increase an attacker’s
dwell time in the network to deplete their resources
and gather more information about their tactics,
techniques and procedures? Would the return on
being able to do this be of sufficient value for threat
analysis to warrant the activity?
• How might cyber defenders force an attacker to
follow a desired path through a network?
• How might cyber defenders instil fear in an attacker
online? Would it be sufficient to startle them and, if
so, how might this be achieved?
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5.3.3. Measures of success. When considering
measures of success participants raised the issue of what
success might look like; whether it would look the same
for all stakeholders and what it would look like to a
customer. Participants felt that cyber defenders should
also distinguish between measures of success at the level
of individual cyber deception techniques as well as when
they were used in combination and at steps in-between,
such as observing cues that support deception
techniques. One participant suggested we might want to
look at a broader range of measures, perhaps even
including stories about deception experiences in our
network that were publicised on hacking forums.
Another participant questioned whether measures of
success might be overrated and that there could be
benefits in blind application of techniques. This led to a
discussion about whether this would be acceptable from
a cost and ethical perspective.
5.3.4. Risks, opportunities and threats. When
considering risks, opportunities and threats participants
raised the opportunity or threat of advertising the
presence of deception and considered whether this might
increase or decrease its effectiveness against an attacker.
The point was also made that there could be unforeseen
consequences if cyber deception techniques were used in
combination – for example, might we inadvertently risk
launching a denial of service against ourselves as
defenders?
Commercial considerations that could pose a risk to
the development of cyber deception include the
confidence cyber defenders have in cyber deception
technology. One participant suggested that people would
rather use cryptography than hay-stacking or covert
paths. Cyber defenders need to increase confidence in
the use of cyber deception technology as well as the
integrity of the technology itself. Other points that
participants believed organisations needed to consider
were the legalities and ethics of using cyber deception
technology and the cost of resources to develop and
deploy it.
Finally, an interesting theme that emerged as a result
of the journey mapping exercise was that of time. There
are temporal costs in terms of the length of the lifecycle
of cyber deception exploits as well as other temporal
aspects to consider such as the necessary length of time
for exposure to cues, dwell time in the network, the
potential value of false temporal cues as well as the
temporal aspects of the commercial development and
deployment of cyber deception technology.

6. Limitations and reflections

a generative dialogue to discuss ways of designing cyber
deception tools and techniques that fuse deception
techniques from different contexts and that bring
together cognitive and technology effects. Running a
design thinking workshop online across two countries
and two time zones worked well and could be replicated
with similarly sized groups of participants. Larger
groups of participants would be difficult to manage in an
online setting and to maintain organic group discussions.
Running the workshop online was successful but
resource intensive and demonstrates the need for skilled
facilitators. This was a relatively small, qualitative, study
but we believe this limitation was off-set by the expertise
of our participants. Now we have demonstrated the
potential of using design thinking for cyber deception
our next steps will be to run further iterations of this
workshop with a broader range of participants both in
terms of occupation and academic disciplines. We would
also like to trial other design thinking tasks within the
online workshop and to prototype and test the outputs
from this workshop further.
The potential benefits of using design thinking
included a broad conversation about how to affect the
attacker’s behaviour and decision-making processes
while in the network. Participants demonstrated
divergent thinking by taking the provocations as a
creative starting point and expanding the potential
solutions from the technology through to the cognitive
and behavioural effects on the attacker and how to
achieve them. The journey map demonstrated
convergent thinking with regard to operationalising
cyber deception on a network. Participant discussions
raised the positioning of a deceptive asset as part of an
integrated and layered network defence strategy. The
difficulty of evaluating and assessing the effectiveness
of cyber deception technology against different attacker
types and under a range of commercial pressures is an
important consideration.
From a research perspective a range of interesting
areas for future work were identified. We identified a
need for research that looks at fear, surprise and startle
effects online; whether this is possible to achieve and
what these effects might look like. The issue of time
needs further research, specifically the effect of tempo on
designing, developing and delivering cyber deception.
Risks and unanticipated effects of cyber deception
techniques, such as triggering a denial of service attack
and the psychological impact on both attackers and
cyber network defenders, needs to be explored. Each of
these topics requires researchers to lift cyber deception
research into a space that considers the socio-technical
dimension of both the attacker and defender in cyber
deception.

The use of design thinking enabled us to bring different
academic disciplines and practitioners’ experiences into
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7. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the potential
benefits of using design thinking to synthesise deception
techniques from a range of contexts and illustrated the
potential this could offer for developing new cyber
deception tools and techniques. Such tools and
techniques may offer a more subtle and nuanced
approach to cyber deception and could become an
important part of the cyber defender’s toolkit. In a
military environment this could complement other
manoeuvrist approaches to warfare. The substantive
contribution has been to highlight areas for future
research and practice in cyber deception. The
methodological contribution has been to demonstrate the
potential value of design thinking for cyber deception
tools. Overall the study demonstrates the value of seeing
the network through the eyes of the attacker and
understanding how their experience could be shaped as
they move through the network.
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